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The buyer’s measure of damages for a seller’s breach: 
Reese v Wong, 2001 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
Buyer’s measure of damages for seller’s breach of contract to sell real property is the 
difference between contract price and fair market value at time of breach, not time of trial. 
Reese v Wong (2001) 93 CA4th 51, 112 CR2d 669 
Buyer and seller entered a contract for sale of a commercial building for $1,085,000. Seller 
terminated the contract two weeks later after accepting another offer for $35,000 more. In 
buyer’s suit for breach of contract, the trial court rejected buyer’s argument that the appropriate 
measure of damages was the difference between the contra t price and the property’s fair market 
value at the time of trial. The court instructed the jury that, under CC §3306, the measure of 
damages for a seller’s breach is “the difference betwe n the price agreed to be paid and the value 
of the estate agreed to be conveyed at the time of the breach.” The court of appeal affirmed.  
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: Out East, where lawyers start negotiating and drafting real estate 
sales contracts after the brokers have gotten the two parties to agree to a price, it is common for a 
seller to repudiate an offer she has already accepted because she has since received an even 
better one and the existing oral contract has not yet been reduced to an enforceable writing. (It’s 
called “gazumping.”) That is harder to do out West, where brokers get everything in writing 
from the very start, so that a seller’s withdrawal ould be an actionable breach. 
In a rising market, however, the temptation may be too great for the seller to resist. She may 
hope, as here, that her buyer will default in some particular, thereby allowing her to extricate 
herself from the deal. Even if that does not work, the risk of being forced to specifically perform 
the contract is not great, since commercial property is no longer regarded as unique, per se, and 
paying damages is usually regarded as a legally sufficient alternative. See CC §3387. 
Furthermore, even the measure of damages is not especially terrifying to the prospectively 
defaulting seller. While we have entirely eliminated the old out-of-pocket measure (the 
“English” rule), even for innocent breaches (such as being unable to convey because title was not 
marketable), the benefit-of-the-bargain alternative markedly suffers from the fact that the 
measurement is taken at breach date, rather than later. Thus, the worst that will happen is that the 
profit generated by the new and better offer will go to the disappointed buyer, but the seller will 
still end up with as much as she would have received under the original deal (except for attorney 
fees, if there is a clause to that effect in the contract).  
The buyer in Reese had a really ingenious argument for increasing his recovery by trying to 
treat his loss as a lis pendens expungement violation rather than as a breach of contract. It’s 
unfortunate that we don’t have some additional disincentive for sellers who repudiate in order to 
take better offers. England has a concept of damages in lieu of specific performance (or 
“equitable damages”) when the former remedy has becom  unavailable, under which damages 
are measured at the trial date rather than the breach d te. (Thanks to Jeffrey W. Lem, a Toronto 
attorney, for teaching me this.) No California case has ever mentioned such a concept, however, 
so it’s probably going to take a statutory amendment for that to happen here. —Roger Bernhardt 
 
